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Abstract 
 
This study tests the theory of rationing, examining changes in household consumption 
behavior during the transition to a market economy in Poland, 1987–92.  A model of 
consumption under rationing is developed and fitted to prereform quarterly data from the Polish 
Household Budget Survey. Virtual prices, prices at which consumers would have voluntarily 
chosen the rationed levels of goods, are derived for food and housing.  The prereform Almost 
Ideal Demand System (AIDS) model with rationing is estimated.  Estimates from the virtual 
AIDS yield plausible values for price and income elasticities. The AIDS model (without 
rationing) is also fitted to postreform quarterly household survey data for comparison and 
evaluation.  When the two sets of results are compared, the impacts of rationing are consistent 
with the theory.  Own-price elasticities for nonrationed goods are larger after the reform, and 
there is increased complementarity and decreased substitutability for the nonrationed goods. The 
results for Poland show a 75 percent decline in real household welfare over the transition and 
this welfare loss is one-third the value obtained using reported prices. 
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EMPIRICAL TESTS OF IMPACTS OF RATIONING: 
THE CASE OF POLAND IN TRANSITION 
 
Introduction 
Under the centrally planned systems in the Central and Eastern European nations (in Poland, 
for example), many consumer goods were rationed.  Available goods with artificially low prices 
were frequently allocated through waiting time in long queues and through waiting lists.  
Consumer goods ranging from necessities, such as housing, to luxuries, such as cars, were 
rationed or in short supply.  Consumers could not buy the desired quantities of goods at the 
government-controlled prices.  Podkaminer (1982, 1986, 1988) has documented these distortions 
in relative prices for Poland.  The observed food shortages were caused in part by the spillovers 
from other markets of rationed but underpriced goods and services.  Rationing may have led to 
increased demand for the goods that could be purchased freely, because consumers spent less 
than desired on the rationed goods.  According to the World Bank, rationing of meat resulted in 
free market prices three to four times higher than the official prices in state shops in Poland 
during 1988 and 1989 (Atkinson and Micklewright 1992).  Consumption subsidies represented 
about 11 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) for 1987, including 3.4 percent for food, 
2.9 percent for housing, 1.6 percent for transport, 1.3 percent for energy, and 0.9 percent for 
health and medicine (World Bank 1989). 
During the period of transition, the supply and demand for consumer goods changed.  Price 
and trade liberalization led to an improvement in the range and quality of available goods and 
services.  Some of the expected benefits of freeing prices appeared quickly.  For example, 
queues for the basic foodstuffs disappeared.  How did households adjust their behavior when the 
opportunity sets of consumption goods changed?  The consequences of removing non-price 
rationing for demands of food and other goods and services affected household consumption 
patterns and consumer welfare.  Policies to compensate the particularly the disadvantaged for the 
costs of economic adjustment were put into place.  All of these transition policies could have 
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benefited from a more complete understanding of consumer demand parameters and more 
reliable estimates of changes in the cost of living.  Our analysis shows that these improved 
capacities for understanding consumer behavior are easily obtained for transition economies and 
that they can make a real difference in the assessment of the effects of reforms and in appropriate 
policy responses.  Finally, little empirical evidence exists for price elasticities for transition 
economies that adequately reflect the choice environment. 
A model of consumption under rationing is developed where household maximizes utility 
subject to budget and ration constraint.  Following Neary and Roberts (1980) the main 
theoretical results under rationing are derived: rationing reduces the responsiveness of the 
demand for any nonrationed good to its own price, and increases in the rationed good decrease 
the demand for substitutes and increase the demand for complements.  This study tests these 
hypotheses empirically using data for Polish households during the transition.  Demand systems 
incorporating rationing effects before the reform using virtual prices and after the reform without 
rationing are estimated.  Finally, welfare implications are developed to determine whether the 
consumers are better- or worse-off after the transformation from a centrally planned economy. 
 
Rationing and Economic Transition 
Research on quantity rationing has been primarily concerned with how the demands for 
nonrationed market goods were affected by the rationing.  Tobin and Houthakker (1951) 
described how rationing a market good could create a short-run disequilibrium for a related 
Hicksian composite good.  Neary and Roberts (1980) extended the work of Tobin and 
Houthakker (1951) deriving the properties of the demand systems under rationing and compared 
them to these without rationing.  Specifically, Neary and Roberts (1980) used a virtual price 
framework to characterize consumption demand under rationing and derived the Slutsky 
equation analogue for a change in the rationing of a good.  Led by Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980a), empirical studies have followed for the developed and socialist economies.  Deaton 
(1981) presented a technique for generating rationed from nonrationed demands and applied it to 
extended versions of the Linear Expenditure System (LES) and the Almost Ideal Demand 
System (AIDS).  Wang and Chern (1992) used this method to estimate a complete demand 
system for China, incorporating rationing.  Bettendorf and Barten (1995) refined the virtual 
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prices approach and applied Neary and Robert’s (1980) model for rent controls.  To date, 
however, no applications have focused on transition economies and the power of the virtual price 
approach to better define welfare and consumption pattern changes in these periods of major 
economic change. 
Poland was the first Central and Eastern European nation to reestablish a market economy.  
The economic and political transformation in Poland commenced at the beginning of 1990.  The 
goals of the first market-determined reform package were macroeconomic stabilization, rapid 
price liberalization, and a sharp reduction of subsidies.  Economic growth resumed in 1992 when 
the economy started to rebound, spurred by the rapid expansion of a private sector that accounted 
for more than half of the GDP by 1994 (Strong et al. 1996).  Economic growth has continued in 
Poland since 1992.  Rates of unemployment have decreased, and average real wages have 
increased during the postreform period.  Therefore, transition in Poland presents a particularly 
interesting case for behavior of households during transition, because the periods of adjustment 
and recovery were relatively short in duration—to an extent limiting the impacts of confounding 
events. 
 
Demand Systems with Rationing 
If there are limitations on the availability of goods and services, the household maximizes 
utility subject to both budget and ration constraints: 
max.
 x1,x2   8[1, x2)  
subject to 
 p1x1 + p2x2 # I 
 and   x1 # X1, (1) 
where U is a strictly quasi-concave utility function; x1 is a vector of quantities of rationed goods 
and services; x2 is a vector of quantities of nonrationed goods and services; p1 is the vector of 
prices for x1; p2 is the vector of prices for x2; X1 is a vector of ration levels for goods and 
services x1; and I is household total expenditure.  In this model we assume that the rationing 
constraints the household encounters are entirely beyond its influence. 
From the duality theory this utility maximization problem can be solved by minimizing the 
following cost function, 
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CR(U0,p1,p2,X1) = minx2 {p1X1 + p2x2  st. U(X1, x2) $ U0} 
 = p1X1 + minx2 {p2x2  st. U(X1, x2) $ U0}  
 = p1X1 80, X1, p2), (2) 
where U(X1, x2) = max U(x1, x2); CR(U0,p1,p2,X1) is the rationed cost function, which gives the 
minimum cost for reaching U0 at p1 and p2, in the presence of rationed goods and services x1 = 
X1;DQGWKHIXQFWLRQ 80, X1, p2) has the usual properties of the cost function (Deaton 1981). 
The contribution of Neary and Roberts (1980) was to introduce the concept of virtual prices 
as a tool for showing the equivalence between the demand models with and without rationing.  
The virtual price vector p1* is the price vector for the goods and services quantity vector x1 at 
which the consumer optimally and voluntarily chooses the ration level of goods and services X1, 
X1 = x1c(U0, p1*, p2). (3) 
The virtual price is defined as an implicit function of the ration level of goods and services 
and prices of nonrationed goods and services.  The implicit function will exist and yield a unique 
vector p1* if the utility function is strictly quasi-concave, continuous, and strictly monotonic 
(Neary and Roberts 1980). 
Neary and Roberts (1980) and Deaton (1981) have used the duality theory and virtual prices 
to derive the properties of the demand system with rationing in terms of the traditional 
unconstrained demand system.  From Equations (2) and (3) these authors obtained the following 
main result, showing the relationship between nonrationed and rationed expenditure functions: 
CR(U0, p1, p2, X1) = [p1 - f(U0, X1, p2)]X1 + C(U0, f(U0, X1, p2), p2) 
 = [p1 - p1*]X1 + C(U0, f(U0, X1, p2), p2). (4) 
The impact of the rationed goods and services on the demands for other goods and services, 
following Neary and Roberts (1980) and given that the virtual prices exist, is 
x2
Rc(U0, p1, p2, X1) = x2c(U0, p1*, p2). (5) 
Differentiating Equation (5) with respect to X1, we obtain, 
[Mx2Rc/MX1] = [Mx2c/Mp1]/[Mx1c/Mp1], (6) 
where x1c and x2c are Hicksian demand functions without rationing, and x2Rc is a Hicksian 
demand function with rationing.  If the cross-price substitution term Mx2c/Mp1 > 0 given that 
[Mx1c/Mp1] is always negative, then [Mx2Rc/MX1] < 0.  This means that an increase in the ration 
level X1 will decrease the demand for the substitute goods and services.  If the cross-price 
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substitution term Mx2c/Mp1 < 0, then [Mx2Rc/MX1] > 0, implying that an increase in the ration level 
X1 will increase the demand for goods and services that are complements. 
From Equation (4) we observe that the expenditure necessary to reach utility level U0 when 
the household faces virtual prices p1* and observed p2 is equal to the actual expenditure function 
under rationing CR = I plus a household compensation for the rationed goods and services  
[p1* - p1]X1, 
C (U0, p1*, p2) = I + [p1* - p1]X1. 
The Marshallian demand functions under rationing and nonrationing are equal when the 
minimum cost to reach utility level U0 is C (U0, p1*, p2) and the demand function without 
rationing is evaluated at the virtual prices p1*, 
x2
R(p1, p2, X1, I) = x2(p1, p2, I+[p1* - p1]X1), (7) 
and X1 = x1(p1*, p2, I+[p1* - p1]X1). (8) 
Differentiating Equation (7) with respect to I yields, 
Mx2
R/MI = Mx2/MI - (Mx2Rc/MX1)(Mx1/MI). (9) 
Thus, the effect of a change in total expenditure can be decomposed into the normal effect 
without rationing and a “spillover” effect of rationing.  The sign of the latter depends on the 
substitute or complement relationships among the goods and services.  If all goods are normal, 
an increase in income will increase the demand for substitute goods and services and decrease 
the demand for complement goods and services. 
Neary and Roberts (1980) also derived the relationship between the own-price derivative of 
demand for the rationed goods and services to the own-price derivative of demand for the 
nonrationed goods and services.  Differentiating Equation (5) with respect to p2 and using 
Equation (3) yields, 
Mx2
Rc/M p2 = Mx2c/Mp2 - (Mx1c/Mp2)(Mx2Rc/MX1). (10) 
Thus, price changes in the case of rationing have direct and indirect effects.  From Equation (6) 
and using that Mx1c/Mp2= Mx2c/Mp1, the symmetry of the Slutsky substitution matrix, and 
substituting in Equation (10) yields, 
Mx2
Rc/M p2 - Mx2c/Mp2 = - (Mx1c/Mp2)(Mx1c/Mp1)-1(Mx1c/Mp2) >0. (11) 
Because (Mx1c/Mp1) < 0 and (Mx1c/Mp2) is squared, Mx2Rc/M p2 > Mx2c/Mp2.  Rationing reduces the 
responsiveness of the demand for any nonrationed commodity to its own price.  Price elasticities 
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of demand are lower when there is rationing than in the absence of rationing—demands are less 
elastic. 
 
Empirical Specification, Data, and Estimation 
The AIDS Demand System with Virtual Prices 
The virtual price form of the AIDS cost function in logarithmic form is, 
log C(U, p, pV) = (1 - U) log[a(p, pV )] + U log[b(p, pV )], (12) 
where C(U, p, pV) is the cost function, p is a vector of market prices, pV is a vector of virtual 
prices (prices of the rationed goods and services), and U is the utility level.  For a(p, pV) and b(p, 
pV) specific functional forms are introduced.  These are positive, linearly homogeneous concave 
functions in prices. Following Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b), a translog flexible functional 
form is chosen for a(p, pV), 
log a(p, pV  0 + 33j j log pj + 3j Vj log pVj 
 + 1/2[3i3j i j* log pi log pj 
 + 3 i3 j ViVj*log pVi log pVj 
 + 3i3j iVj*log pi log pVj  
  +3i3j Vi j*log pVi log pj]. (13) 
Compared to the standard AIDS model, the linear component for Equation (13) contains an 
extra term 3j Vj logpVj in virtual prices and the quadratic component includes extra cross-product 
terms.  The function b(p, pV) is defined as, 
log b(p, pV) = log a(p, pV) + Jpj M. (14) 
Substituting the expressions for a(p, pV) and b(p, pV) into the cost function (12) and applying 
Shephard’s lemma yields the budget shares Mlog C/M log pi = wi.  These shares are from the 
virtual cost function (12).  Therefore, they are functions of virtual prices, market prices, and the 
utility level. Substituting the expression for utility from the cost function into the virtual share 
equations gives, 
wi * pV  i + 3j ij log pj + 3j iVj log pVj i log [ IV/a(p, pV)], (15) 
where IVLVWKHYLUWXDOWRWDOH[SHQGLWXUHDQG ij  ij*  ji*DQG iVj  ViVj*  VjVi*).  
When the price index log a(p, pV) is replaced by the Stone index log P( p, pV) = 3iwi log pi, the 
virtual share equations become linear, i.e., 
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wi * pV  i + 3j ij log pj + 3j iVj log pVj i log [ IV/ P( p, pV)]. (16) 
Qualitative demographic and other “translating” variables can be introduced into the 
demand systems model to examine effects for households with different observable 
characteristics, e.g., 
wi * pV  i
**
 + 3j ij log pj + 3j iVj log pVj i log [ IV/P(p, pV)], (17) 
ZKHUH i
**  io + 3s =1
S is Ds for s = 1,..., S and Ds are the translating variables.  The restrictions 
on the parameters required to satisfy theoretical properties of utility maximization are the 
following: homogeneity 3j ij = 0 and 3j iVj V\PPHWU\ ij  jiDQG iVj = jVi; and adding 
up3i i** = 1, 3i is = 0, 3 i ij = 0, 3I iVj = 0, and 3i i = 0. 
 
Data 
The data for this analysis are a subsample of the Polish Household Budget Survey conducted 
by the Central Statistical Office of Poland (GUS) during the years 1987–1992 (obtained from the 
World Bank).  The survey is part of a long-term series of annual household budget surveys in 
Poland, consisting of both cross-sectional and panel data.  The survey provides extensive 
information on household size, household composition, the age, gender, and occupational status 
of household members, sources of income, and expenditure patterns.  The surveys are conducted 
quarterly, but each household is surveyed only once per year (Goreski and Peczkowski 1992).  
The expenditure data are quarterly. Detailed information on the survey is given in Adam (1993). 
For the present analysis, the years 1987, 1988, and 1989 were defined as the “prereform” period 
(18,682 observations), and the years 1990, 1991, and 1992 were defined as the “postreform” 
period (14,303 observations).  The sample was representative of the population of non-privately 
employed households. 
In the application of AIDS, the dependent variables are the budgeted shares for the six 
expenditure groups: food (including the value of self-consumption); alcohol and tobacco; 
clothing and footwear; housing (actual implicit rental); fuel, electricity, communication, i.e., 
household utilities and transport; and other.  Expenditures include household spending on all 
consumer goods and services plus the money value of goods and services bought on credit or 
received for free.  In the prereform demand model, food and housing are the rationed goods.  The 
explanatory variables for the AIDS model are logarithms of prices (virtual prices for the rationed 
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goods and actual prices for nonrationed goods) and total household expenditure.  Table 1 
summarizes the household expenditure patterns for the six groups of goods and services 
(authors’ calculations) used for the empirical analysis. 
Food was the most important expenditure category for all years, accounting for 
approximately 45 percent of total expenditure.  The second most important expenditure share 
before the reform was clothing and footwear, approximately 16 percent.  Shares for housing, 
fuel, electricity, transport, and communication were smaller. These reported expenditures were 
impacted by price controls during the prereform period.  The expenditure shares for alcohol and 
tobacco, clothing and footwear, and housing were lower postreform, but the shares for fuel, 
electricity, transport and communication, and other were larger.  Facing declining real incomes, 
consumers tried to maintain their level of food consumption by increasing the share of income 
spent on food. 
A practical approach was taken to find the virtual prices, arguing that the prices in Germany 
provided a good measure of nonrationed prices of goods consumed in Poland.  The two countries 
are geographically close, and Germany is a major trading partner. The unregulated prices in 
Poland and Germany moved together during the period 1987–89.  A high positive correlation 
existed between the relative price of clothing (nonrationed good) in Germany and in Poland.  If 
the prices move together, the markets are not separated  (Mundlak and Larson 1992).  The 
quality differences due to the higher incomes in Germany will “cancel out” if relative prices are 
used. The basic issue was to construct an estimate of how much the relative prices of rationed 
goods were distorted in Poland. 
To derive the relative price effect of rationing on food we computed, 
lnRPF = ln[(pFG/pOGG)/(pFP/pOGP)] = (3i=14 iP lnpiG - 3j=511 jP lnpjG) - (3i=14 iP lnpiP - 3j=511 jP 
lnpjP) 
= 3i=1
4 i
P ln(piG/piP) - 3j=511  jP ln(pjG/pjP), (18) 
where 3i=14 iP = 1, 3j=511  jP = 1, and pFG/pOGG and pFP/pOGP are the relative prices of food with 
respect to the other goods for Germany and Poland, respectively.  The prices for good i for 
Germany and Poland are, respectively, piG and piP iP are the relative expenditure shares in the 
3ROLVKIRRGFDWHJRU\DQG jP are the relative expenditure shares for nonrationed goods.  LnRPF 
was then the proportional increase in the relative price of food in Germany compared to Poland.  
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The virtual food price in Poland was then defined to be (1 + lnRPF) multiplied by the actual 
Polish food price.  
The related price for housing was computed using the same procedure, 
lnRPH = ln[(pHG/pOGG)/(pHP/pOGP)] =(lnpHG - 3j=511 jP lnpjG)-(lnpHP - 3j=511 jPlnpjP) 
 = ln(pHG/pHP) - 3j=511 jP ln(pjG/pjP), (19) 
where 3j=511 MP = 1, and pHG/pOGG and pHP/pOGP are the relative prices of housing with respect to 
the other goods in Germany and Poland, respectively.  The virtual price of housing in Poland 
was then defined to be (1 + lnRPH) multiplied by the actual Polish housing price index. 
Two types of price indices were constructed and used in estimation of the complete demand 
system for Poland—the Törnqvist price index, defined as logP(pt,pt-1;T)=3k1/2(wt,k+wt-
1,k)log(pt,k/pt-1,k),  
where wt,k and wt-1,k are the budget shares for good k in two different periods t and t-1, and 
Laspeyres index, defined as Pt = 3g wgtpgt.  Quarterly price indices were constructed using the 
data on quarterly inflation rates (obtained from GUS) in Poland for 1987 to 1992.  Regional 
price variation for food items before and after the reform was recorded by GUS (1993 and 1994). 
The indices were also computed regionally, based on results from earlier studies indicating this 
factor as important (World Bank 1995). 
 
Estimation 
The empirical specification of the demand system with virtual prices is, 
wit*pV  io + 3s is Dst+ 3j ij log pjt + 3j iVj log pVjt i log[ItV/P(pt, ptV)] + uit, (20) 
where i = 1, ..., n goods, and t = 1, ..., T observations.  For comparison, the related specification 
for the standard demand system is, 
wit  io
*
 + 3s is
*Dst+ 3j ij* logpjt i*log (It/Pt) + uit*. (21) 
If the disturbance terms ui t in Equations (20) and (21) satisfy the usual stochastic assumptions 
(the errors are identically and independently distributed with zero mean and constant variance), 
ordinary least squares can be applied directly to estimate the expenditure share equations.  
However, if the errors are contemporaneously correlated across equations, then generalized least 
squares can be used to gain asymptotic efficiency.  The seemingly unrelated regression 
specification was used for this analysis.  Because the error variance-covariance matrix of the full 
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model is singular, the share equation for other goods was dropped from the estimation and its 
parameters recovered using the adding up restrictions. 
To compare how the demanded quantity changes in response to the changes in prices and 
income, elasticities were computed for the two AIDS specifications.  The virtual uncompensated 
expenditure elasticity of demand for good i is, 
Ei
V  i/wi + 1. 
The virtual uncompensated price elasticity with respect to the market price is, 
ijV = - ij  ij - iwj)/wi , 
ZKHUH ijLVHTXDOWRZKHQL MDQGRWKHUZLVH ijV is the elasticity of good i with respect to 
the market price of good j, and wi and wj are (the mean) budget shares of goods i and j.  The 
virtual uncompensated price elasticity i with respect to the virtual price j is, 
iVjV = - ij iVj - iwj)/wi. 
The virtual compensated price elasticities are,  
ij V*  ijV +wj EVDQG iVjV*  iVjV + wj EV. 
 
Empirical Results 
Price and Expenditure Elasticities  
First, the prereform AIDS model was estimated, ignoring rationing effects.  The results were 
erratic, with high compensated own-price elasticities and positive signs for food, alcohol and 
tobacco, clothing and footwear, and housing (Table 2). Hence, the model ignoring rationing did 
not fit the data well.  The AIDS model with virtual prices was then estimated, and the parameters 
from the share equations were used to compute a set of associated demand elasticities.1  Table 3 
presents the own- and cross-price elasticities.  All the compensated and uncompensated own-
price elasticities are negative and their standard errors are relatively small, with the exception of 
fuel, making them significant at the conventional levels.  The own-price elasticities for food and 
fuel are less than one whereas for alcohol, clothing, housing, and other goods they are bigger 
than one, suggesting elastic demand. The estimates from the virtual AIDS then give plausible 
values for price and income elasticities. 
The postreform AIDS model was estimated for the years 1990, 1991, and 1992.2  Table 4 
presents the associated values for Marshallian and Hicksian own- and cross-price elasticities.  
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All own-price elasticities are negative as expected and their standard errors are relatively small, 
making all of them significant at the conventional levels.  The own-price elasticities for alcohol 
and tobacco, clothing and footwear, housing, and other are larger than one, whereas the price 
elasticity of demand for food and fuel, which includes electricity, transport, and communication, 
is the lowest of all commodities.  This is expected considering the importance of these items in 
the Poland’s consumer basket.  The demand for food and fuel, electricity, transport, and 
communication is price inelastic, whereas the rest of the commodities are price elastic.  Food is 
the most price inelastic; clothing and footwear are the most price elastic. Most of the cross-price 
elasticities are small.  The lower values of cross-price effects indicate that consumers are more 
responsive to own-price rather than prices of other commodities.  For the translating variables 
(see Tables 5 and 6), the adult equivalents3 in the households had a positive effect on food and a 
negative effect on the rest of the budget shares.  The negative sign of the coefficients for the 
number of adult equivalents per household suggests economies of size.  Age and education level 
of the head of household variables had small effects on the estimated budget shares.  Finally, we 
performed a Chow test for structural change comparing the post- and prereform results.  We 
reject the hypothesis equality of the coefficients between pre- and postreform specifications. 
The results from the Polish study are similar to the results from the study on Belgium using 
the data for the Interwar period presented by Bettendorf and Barten (1995), who estimated the 
Rotterdam demand system under rationing of housing.  For both countries, the income 
elasticities for food were positive but significantly less than 1, and for the other groups were 
luxury goods.  All compensated demands were rather sensitive to own-price changes in Belgium. 
 In Poland the compensated demands for food and fuel were not sensitive to own-price changes 
but the demands for the other groups were very sensitive to own-price changes. 
 
Empirical Tests of Rationing Effects 
The classic literature on rationing by Tobin and Houthakker (1951) followed by Neary and 
Roberts (1980) discussed the main relationships between the effects on demand during rationing 
of changes in prices, incomes, and ration levels and the effects on demand without rationing of 
changes in prices and incomes.  These authors showed that the demand elasticities in a free 
market situation could be compared with those in a regime of rationing.  In this section we 
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empirically test the main theoretical propositions from the demand model under rationing.  
Rationing changes the comparative static results, and pre- and postreform cross-price elasticities 
can be compared. 
From Equation (6) an increase in the rationed goods and services decreases the demand for 
substitutes and increases the demand for goods and services that are complements.  Rationing 
reduces the responsiveness of demand for any nonrationed commodity to its own-price (Equation 
11).  Results comparing the two AIDS models, incorporating rationing effects in the prereform 
period and without rationing in the postreform period, confirm the following: 
a) Decreased substitutability in the postreform period as indicated by the cross-price  
elasticities, i.e., decreased cross-price elasticities of demand for the substitute goods for 
food—alcohol and tobacco, clothing and footwear—and decreased cross-price elasticity 
of demand for the substitute goods for housing—fuel, electricity, transport, and 
communication. 
b) Increased complementarity after the reform: increased cross-price elasticity of demand 
for the complementary goods for food—fuel, electricity, transport, and communication. 
c) Demands for nonrationed goods and services (clothing and footwear, fuel, electricity,  
transport, and communication) are less elastic in the prereform period.  The observed 
increase in own-price elasticities (in absolute values) reflects an increase in 
responsiveness as a result of removing the rationing system. 
There are, however, a few contradictions. 
 
Welfare Implications 
One of the main issues for the estimation of the Polish household demand system was to 
determine if the households were better or worse off as a result of the transformation from the 
centrally planned to market economy.  With the estimated coefficients from the virtual AIDS 
before the reform and the standard AIDS after the reform we calculated the compensating 
variations given by the differences in cost function or CV = C(p1, U0 ) - C(p0, U0) for each 
household in the final quarter, the fourth quarter of 1992.  The base period was the fourth quarter 
of 1987.  The compensating variation was estimated as the income change necessary to 
compensate the household for the price changes, while holding utility constant.  The calculated 
 Empirical Tests of Impacts of Rationing: The Case of Poland in Transition / 15 
compensating variations were positive for every family indicating that each household 
experienced a welfare loss at given utility as a result of the price liberalization. 
The alternative estimates of total welfare loss for Poland are computed and reported in Table 
7.  We make two calculations for comparison, one allowing for rationing and a second ignoring 
rationing.  The compensating variation is three times higher in the case ignoring rationing.  
However, to know whether the household was better or worse off after the reform, we need to 
know how much the income changed.  Table 7 shows this as the expenditure change.  Finally, 
the ratio of total welfare loss to the 1987 real total expenditures was computed.  The total welfare 
loss over the transition period 1987–92 was 10.51 million zlotys, or 75 percent of the 1987 
average income.  This estimated loss was roughly three times higher when ignoring rationing 
than when allowing for it.  Specifically, the total welfare loss was 36.73 million zlotys when we 
did not consider rationing effects versus 10.51 million zlotys when we allowed for the effects of 
rationing.  Using virtual prices rather than actual prices for the rationed goods reduces greatly 
(by a factor of three) the estimated welfare loss during the transition. 
 
Conclusions 
The study has applied the theory of rationing for an economy in transition using the 
experience of Poland.  An AIDS model of consumption under rationing was applied.  For the 
prereform sample, the AIDS model with virtual prices was estimated.  The resulting demand 
elasticities had the anticipated signs (negative) for the compensated own-price elasticities and 
were of reasonable magnitude.  The estimated virtual AIDS also gave plausible values for cross-
price and income elasticities.  Compared to other studies of consumer demand in Poland and for 
other transition economies, the results were remarkably good.  They are, for example, 
appropriate for making cost-of-living comparisons, pre- and postreform.  The postreform AIDS 
model was estimated and income and price elasticities were computed.  We found the following: 
• Demands were less elastic when there was rationing. 
• An increase in the quantity of rationed goods and services increased the demand for 
goods and services that are complements. 
 
• An increase in the quantity of rationed goods and services decreased the demand for 
goods and services that are substitutes. 
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Assessing the effects of the transition on the market economy of Poland requires careful 
analysis of consumption patterns, total expenditure, rationing, and prices.  More accurately 
reflecting rationing and incorporating the effects of rationing before the reform yielded estimates 
of welfare loss that were orders of magnitude lower than those commonly reported.  The virtual 
prices were much larger than the actual or reported prices for the rationed goods during the 
prereform period.  The actual prices for rationed goods increased much more than the virtual 
prices as reforms progressed.  Therefore, changes in real GDP per capita overestimated the 
welfare loss during the transition.  The results for Poland showed a 211 percent decline in real 
household welfare using the CPI, which did not account for costs of shortages/rationing, 
compared to a 75 percent decline using virtual prices.  These results provide a more complete 
appreciation for the consumption patterns observed during the economic transition in Poland. 
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Table 1.  Household expenditure patterns (share of total expenditures) for Poland, 1987–1992 
Expenditure Group 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
 
Food 
 
0.46 
 
0.43 
 
0.47 
 
0.51 
 
0.45 
 
0.42 
 
Alcohol and tobacco 
 
0.04 
 
0.04 
 
0.04 
 
0.03 
 
0.03 
 
0.03 
 
Clothing and footwear 
 
0.14 
 
0.15 
 
0.16 
 
0.10 
 
0.09 
 
0.08 
 
Housing 
 
0.12 
 
0.12 
 
0.12 
 
0.10 
 
0.10 
 
0.10 
 
Fuel, electricity, transport,  
and communication 
 
0.09 
 
0.10 
 
0.08 
 
0.11 
 
0.15 
 
0.17 
 
Other 
 
0.15 
 
0.16 
 
0.13 
 
0.15 
 
0.17 
 
0.20 
Source: Polish Household Budget Survey 1987–92. 
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Table 2.  Estimated demand elasticities: AIDS before the reformsa 
Groupb Food Alcohol Clothing Housing Fuel Other 
 
Food -0.11 (0.02)
Marshallian
0.06 (0.01)
Elasticities
-0.30 (0.02) -0.34 (0.02) -0.29 (0.02) 0.31
 
Alcohol 0.55 (0.12) 9.98 (1.83) -35.28 (4.78) 20.64 (2.64) -1.12 (0.62) 4.15
 
Clothing -1.28 (0.08) -10.08 (1.36) 24.90 (3.74) -13.03 (2.09) 0.44 (0.45) -2.09
 
Housing -1.94 (0.10) 7.49 (0.96) -16.64 (2.66) 7.68 (1.54) 1.48 (0.39) 0.39
 
Fuel -2.13 (0.12) -0.57 (0.31) 0.74 (0.79) 2.03 (0.53) -4.64 (0.45) 3.16
 
Other 0.76       
 
1.18      
 
-2.12     
 
0.34     
 
1.80    -3.30
 
Food 0.21 (0.02)
Hicksian
0.09 (0.01)
Elasticities
-0.21 (0.02) -0.27 (0.02) -0.23 (0.02) 0.41
 
Alcohol 1.08 (0.12) 10.02 (1.83) -35.13 (4.78) 20.76 (2.65) -1.04 (0.62) 4.30
 
Clothing -0.72 (0.08) -10.04 (1.37) 25.06 (3.74) -12.90 (2.09) 0.53 (0.45) -1.93
 
Housing -1.18 (0.09) 7.55 (0.96) -16.42 (2.66) 7.85 (1.54) 1.60 (0.39) 0.61
 
Fuel -1.44 (0.12) -0.52 (0.31) 0.93 (0.79) 2.19 (0.53) -4.53 (0.45) 3.36
 
Other 
 
1.42       
 
1.23      
 
-1.93    
 
0.49    
 
1.91 
 
-3.11
 
Food 
 Income Elasticities 
0.67 (0.004)   
 Mean shares 
0.49    
  
 
Alcohol 
 
 
 
1.08 (0.006)   
  
0.04    
 
 
 
 
 
Clothing 
 
 
 
1.14 (0.004)   
  
0.14    
 
 
 
 
 
Housing 
 
 
 
1.54 (0.021)   
  
0.11    
 
 
 
 
 
Fuel 
 
 
 
1.41 (0.007)   
  
0.08    
 
 
 
 
 
Other 
 
 
 
1.34              
  
0.14    
 
 
 
 
Notes: a-Figures in parentheses are the estimated standard errors of elasticities. 
b
-Alcohol includes tobacco; Clothing includes footwear; Fuel includes electricity, transport, and 
communication. 
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Table 3.  Estimated demand elasticities: AIDS before the reforms with virtual pricesa 
Groupb Food Alcohol Clothing Housing Fuel Other 
 
 
Food -0.64 (0.02)
Marshallian 
0.01(0.002)
Elasticities 
-0.03 (0.01) -0.20 (0.02) -0.04 (0.01) 0.08
Alcohol 0.27 (0.13) -1.91(0.82) 1.18 (0.85) -0.57 (0.28) 2.93 (0.43) -3.16
Clothing -0.80 (0.09) 0.32(0.23) -2.03 (0.29) 1.88 (0.18) -0.51 (0.17) -0.20
Housing -1.22 (0.06) -0.04(0.02) 0.45 (0.04) -1.30 (0.09) 0.02 (0.05) 0.60
Fuel -1.29 (0.13) 1.32(0.20) -0.83 (0.28) 0.21 (0.31) -0.04 (0.46) -0.65
Other 0.97 -0.92 -0.21 2.60 -0.39 -3.34
 
 
Food -0.08 (0.01)
Hicksian 
0.02(0.002)
Elasticities 
0.01 (0.01) -0.05 (0.02) -0.02 (0.01) 0.11 
Alcohol 1.14 (0.13) -1.90(0.82) 1.23 (0.85) -0.34 (0.28) 2.96 (0.44) -3.10 
Clothing 0.12 (0.09) 0.34(0.24) -1.97 (0.29) 2.13 (0.18) -0.48 (0.17) -0.14 
Housing -0.19 (0.06) -0.02(0.02) 0.52 (0.04) -1.03 (0.09) 0.06 (0.05) 0.66 
Fuel -0.40 (0.13) 1.34(0.20) -0.78 (0.28) 0.44 (0.31) -0.01 (0.46) -0.59 
Other 1.86 -0.90 -0.15 2.83 -0.36 -3.28 
 
 
Food 
  
Income Elasticities 
0.82 (0.003) 
  
Mean Shares 
0.69 
  
Alcohol  1.26 (0.019)  0.01   
Clothing  1.33 (0.014)  0.04   
Housing  1.49 (0.013)  0.18   
Fuel  1.28 (0.020)  0.03   
Other  1.27               0.04   
Notes: a-Figures in parentheses are the estimated standard errors of elasticities. 
b
-Alcohol includes tobacco; Clothing includes footwear; Fuel includes electricity, transport, and 
communication. 
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Table 4.  Estimated demand elasticities: AIDS after the reformsa 
Groupb Food Alcohol Clothing Housing Fuel Other 
 
 
Food -0.62 (0.02)
Marshallian
-0.01 (0.01)
Elasticities
-0.08 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) -0.14 (0.01) 0.16 
Alcohol -0.43 (0.15) -1.70 (0.36) 1.07 (0.46) 0.27 (0.37) -0.20 (0.20) -0.20 
Clothing -0.85 (0.10) 0.40 (0.17) -2.95 (0.49) 1.34 (0.22) -0.19 (0.19) 0.92 
Housing -0.32 (0.11) 0.08 (0.12) 1.18 (0.20) -1.70 (0.28) -0.28 (0.10) -0.39 
Fuel -0.75 (0.04) -0.04 (0.05) -0.10 (0.11) -0.16 (0.07) -0.42 (0.05) 0.39 
Other 0.07 -0.05 0.45 -0.23 0.26 -2.02 
 
 
Food -0.27 (0.02)
Hicksian
0.01 (0.01)
Elasticities
-0.03 (0.02) 0.07 (0.02) -0.05 (0.01) 0.26 
Alcohol 0.18 (0.15) -1.67 (0.36) 1.16 (0.47) 0.38 (0.37) -0.04 (0.20) -0.01 
Clothing -0.17 (0.10) 0.44 (0.17) -2.85 (0.49) 1.46 (0.22) -0.02 (0.19) 1.13 
Housing 0.41 (0.11) 0.13 (0.12) 1.30 (0.20) -1.57 (0.28) -0.10 (0.10) -0.16 
Fuel -0.19 (0.04) -0.01 (0.05) -0.01 (0.11) -0.07 (0.07) -0.28 (0.05) 0.56 
Other 0.84 -0.002 0.57 -0.09 0.46 -1.78 
 
 
Food 
  
Income Elasticities 
0.68 (0.004) 
 
Mean Shares 
0.51 
  
Alcohol  1.20 (0.008) 0.03   
Clothing  1.35 (0.008) 0.08   
Housing  1.42 (0.026) 0.09   
Fuel  1.09 (0.004) 0.13   
Other  1.51             0.16   
Notes: a-Figures in parentheses are the estimated standard errors of elasticities. 
b
-Alcohol includes tobacco; Clothing includes footwear; Fuel includes electricity, transport and 
communication. 
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Table 5.  Demand system parameter estimates and t-ratios: AIDS with virtual prices 
 Food Alcohol Clothing Housing Fuel 
 
Constant 
 
1.902 
(71.53) 
 
-0.025 
(-3.16) 
 
-0.215 
(-11.15) 
 
-0.292 
(-7.25) 
 
-0.019 
(-0.96) 
 
Food price 
 
0.160 
(16.03) 
 
0.005 
(3.47) 
 
-0.025 
(-6.22) 
 
-0.160 
(-14.67) 
 
-0.030 
(-8.74) 
 
Alcohol price 
 
 0.005 
(3.47) 
 
 -0.011 
(-1.11) 
 
 0.015 
(1.40) 
 
-0.006 
(-1.84) 
 
0.036 
(6.71) 
 
Clothing price 
 
-0.025 
(-6.22) 
 
0.015 
(1.40) 
 
-0.045 
(-3.46) 
 
0.086  
(10.69) 
 
-0.022 
(-2.91) 
 
Housing price 
 
-0.160 
(-14.67) 
 
-0.006 
(-1.84) 
 
0.086 
(10.69) 
 
-0.038 
(-2.24) 
 
0.006 
(0.72) 
 
Fuel price 
 
-0.030 
(-8.74) 
 
0.036 
(6.71) 
 
-0.022 
(-2.91) 
 
0.006 
(0.72) 
 
0.027 
(2.16) 
 
Lnexpenditure 
 
-0.125 
(-59.66) 
 
0.003 
(13.85) 
 
0.015 
(23.90) 
 
0.089 
(38.53) 
 
0.007 
(13.92) 
 
Adult 
equivalents 
 
0.043 
(32.31) 
 
-0.002 
(-11.42) 
 
-0.003 
(-7.87) 
 
-0.003 
(-10.26) 
 
-0.003 
(-10.26) 
 
Age 
 
0.003 
(7.68) 
 
-4E-05 
(-0.97) 
 
-6E-05 
(-0.53) 
 
-0.003 
(-6.74) 
 
-9E-05 
(-1.01) 
 
Age squared 
 
-3E-05 
(-6.71) 
 
-1E-06 
(-3.17) 
 
-2E-06 
(-1.89) 
 
3E-05 
(-6.74) 
 
2E-06 
(2.54) 
 
Education 
 
0.009 
(16.84) 
 
0.001 
(12.59) 
 
-2E-04 
(-1.30) 
 
-0.005 
(-8.57) 
 
-0.001 
(-7.23) 
Notes: All prices in logarithms. 
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Table 6.  Demand system parameter estimates and t-ratios: AIDS after the reforms 
 Food Alcohol Clothing Housing Fuel 
 
Constant 
 
2.031 
(75.56) 
 
-0.034 
(-4.38) 
 
-0.203 
(-15.77) 
 
-0.229 
(-11.59) 
 
0.031 
(1.63) 
 
Food price 
 
0.111 
(9.27) 
 
-0.010 
(-2.24) 
 
-0.054 
(-6.94) 
 
-0.009 
(-0.92) 
 
-0.091 
(-18.21) 
 
Alcohol price 
 
-0.010 
(-2.24) 
 
-0.021 
(-1.96) 
 
0.032 
(2.33) 
 
0.009 
(0.78) 
 
-0.005 
(0.84) 
 
Clothing price 
 
-0.054 
(-6.94) 
 
0.032 
(2.33) 
 
-0.154 
(-3.94) 
 
0.110 
(6.19) 
 
-0.012 
(0.80) 
 
Housing price 
 
-0.009 
(-0.92) 
 
0.009 
(0.78) 
 
0.110 
(6.19) 
 
-0.060 
(-2.40) 
 
-0.020 
(-2.23) 
 
Fuel price 
 
-0.091 
(-18.21) 
 
-0.005 
(0.84) 
 
-0.012 
(0.80) 
 
-0.020 
(-2.23) 
 
0.092 
(13.13) 
 
Lnexpenditure 
 
-0.165 
(-67.34) 
 
0.006 
(8.47) 
 
0.028  
(23.90) 
 
0.038 
(20.89) 
 
0.011 
(6.52) 
 
Adult 
equivalents 
 
0.066 
(45.41) 
 
-0.003 
(-8.19) 
 
-0.002 
(-15.77) 
 
-0.019 
(-17.93) 
 
-0.009 
(-8.52) 
 
Age 
 
0.003 
(6.91) 
 
4E-04 
(3.30) 
 
-2-04 
(-0.83) 
 
-0.001 
(-4.90) 
 
-0.001 
(-3.12) 
 
Age squared 
 
-2E-05 
(-5.81) 
 
-8E-06 
(-7.30) 
 
-1E-06 
(-0.71) 
 
1E-05 
(4.74) 
 
1E-05 
(4.89) 
 
Education 
 
0.013 
(-18.21) 
 
0.002 
(12.65) 
 
4E-04 
(1.39) 
 
-0.002 
(-5.55) 
 
-0.004 
(-10.25) 
Notes: All prices in logarithms. 
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Table 7.  Alternative estimated welfare losses for Poland (in million zlotys) 
 Loss With 
Rationing Effects 
Loss Without 
Rationing Effects 
Compensating variation 9.56 32.46 
Expenditure changea -0.92 -4.27 
Total lossb -10.51 -36.73 
Real total expenditure in 1987  14.05 17.41 
Relative lossc 0.75 2.11 
Notes: a- Mean real expenditure in 1992 less mean virtual real total expenditure in 1987 at 1992  
prices when incorporating rationing, and less mean real expenditures in 1987 at 1992 prices, 
when ignoring rationing. 
b
- Total measured loss = - CV + change in virtual real total expenditure at 1992 prices in the case 
with rationing, and total measured loss = - CV + change in real total expenditure at 1992 prices in 
the case without rationing. 
c
- Total welfare loss relative to virtual real total expenditures in 1987 at 1992 prices in the case 
with rationing, and relative to real total expenditures in 1987 at 1992 prices in the case without 
rationing. 
  
 
 
 
Endnotes 
 
1. The parameter estimates and their t statistics are presented in Table 5. 
2. The parameter estimates and their t statistics are presented in Table 6. 
3. Household composition is taken into account by using the adult-equivalent scale, which 
is based on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) scale. 
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